

CHAPTER 7

- Reading 7.1 **Berrios, G.E. (1996).** *The History of Mental Symptoms. Descriptive psychopathology since the nineteenth century.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Page 7
- Reading 7.2 **Kenny, A.J.P. (1996).** Mental Health in Plato's Republic. *Proceedings of the British Academy* (3 December, 1969), pages 229–253. Extract page 229
- Reading 7.3 **Nordenfelt, L (1997a).** The stoic conception of mental disorder: The Case of Cicero. *Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology*, 4, 285–291. (Extract pages 287–288).
- Reading 7.4 **Robinson, D. (1996).** Immortal souls, immortal cities. Chapter 2 in *Wild Beasts and Idle Humours: the insanity defense from antiquity to the present.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Extract pages 55–56
- Reading 7.5 **Kramer, H. and Sprenger, J. (1996).** *Malleus Malleficarum: The Classic Study of Witchcraft.* London: Bracken Books.
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- Reading 7.7 **Zilboorg, G. and Henry, G. W. (1941).** Epilogue, In *A History of Medical Psychology.* London: George Allen and Unwin. Pages 479–510. (Extract pages 522–523.)
- Reading 7.8 **Shorter, E. (1997).** *A History of Psychiatry: from the era of the asylum to the age of prozac.* New York: John Wiley and Sons. (Extract, p325.)

Reading 7.1**EXERCISE 1**

Extract from: Berrios, G.E. (1996). *The History of Mental Symptoms. Descriptive psychopathology since the nineteenth century*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Page 7

Some, like Haslam, even emphasized historical semantics: 'Mad is therefore not a complex idea, as has been supposed, but a complex term for all the forms and varieties of this disease. Our language has been enriched with other terms expressive of this affection . . .'. Inspired by eighteenth century German 'historicism', others saw their role as that of rescuing lost insights from

an obscure (and mythical) psychiatric past. Heinroth, for example, subscribed to a cyclical, Vico-inspired, conception according to which history consisted of the recurrence of few great themes: 'the development of mental forces in humanity is accompanied by an ever advancing, ever more degraded degeneration of these forces'. For him, psychiatry followed a 'developmental' path: 'a study of the kind and degree of recognition and treatment of mental disturbances observed in early antiquity shows that these bear a striking imprint of the childhood of the human spirit'.

Pinel made use of a more 'presentistic' approach (history was a preparation for what was happening now). Influenced by the optimistic historiography of the French revolution, he regarded the past of psychiatry as a museum of failed endeavours.

Reading 7.2

EXERCISE 2

Extract from opening section of: Kenny, A.J.P. (1996). Mental Health in Plato's Republic. *Proceedings of the British Academy* (3 December, 1969), pages 229–253. Extract page 229

The concept of mental health was Plato's invention. Metaphors drawn from sickness are no doubt as old as metaphor itself, and the first recorded application of the Greek word for 'healthy' was to a sound argument rather than to a sound body (*Iliad* 8. 524). Hebrew and Greek poets used such metaphors on occasion for states

of mind, and especially for passion, rage, and madness. Thus Aeschylus' Prometheus is reminded that words are the healers of sick anger (1. 378) and Xerxes' mother in the *Persae* describes the rash ambitions of her son as 'a disease of the mind' (1. 750). The Lord told Isaiah to shut the eyes of 'his people, lest they be converted and healed (Isa. 6 : 10) and to Jeremiah he promised to heal the disloyalty of Israel (Jer. 3 : 21). But nothing in Greek thought before Plato suggests that the notion of a healthy mind was more than a metaphor; and nowhere in the Old Testament is sin represented as a sickness of the soul. It was Plato who in the *Gorgias* developed the metaphor in unprecedented detail, and in the *Republic* crossed the boundary between metaphor and philosophical theory.

Reading 7.3

EXERCISE 3

Extract from: Nordenfelt, L (1997a). The stoic conception of mental disorder: The Case of Cicero. *Philosophy, Psychiatry and Psychology*, 4, 285–291. (Extract pages 287–288).

In order to get the quickest and most concise introduction to Cicero's (and in general the Stoic) philosophy of mental health let us quote Cicero himself in the fourth disputation. Consider first the definition of a disorder of the soul which Cicero attributes to Zeno, the founder of the Stoic school, (340–264 B.C.): "This then is Zeno's definition of disorder, which he terms 'pathos,' that it is an agitation of the soul alien from right reason and contrary to nature" (VI, 339). Cicero then gives a general description of the health of the soul and provides a comparison with the health of the body:

For as in the body the adjustment of the various parts, of which we are made up, in their fitting relation to one another is health, so health of the soul means a condition when its judgements and beliefs are in harmony, and such health of soul is virtue, which some say is temperance alone, others a condition obedient to the dictates of temperance and following close upon it and without specific difference, but whether it be the one or the other, it exists, they say, in the wise man only. (XIII, 359)

This quotation reveals some features of Cicero's thought over and above what I have already said. The mentally healthy, i.e., the wise, man is in some kind of *balance*. Here Cicero refers to the well-known theory of somatic health expressed by the Hippocratic school and later developed by Galen. In this ancient theory, the idea was that health prevailed when the primary parts of the body balanced each other in a harmony. In the popular interpretation this harmony consisted in a harmony between the humors of the body: the blood, the phlegm and the yellow and black bile.

The other very important feature which pertains peculiarly to mental health is the idea that the soul to such a great extent is identified with judgments and beliefs. (Observe that Cicero oscillates between using the terms "*iudicium*" (judgment) and "*opinio*" (belief) in his characterizations. In the following I shall consistently use "judgment.") There is a salient *cognitive* interpretation of the soul, to put it in modern terms. This idea is in fact the cornerstone of Cicero's philosophy of the disorders.

	Good	Evil
Present		
Future		

The judgments of the soul are first divided along two primary dimensions: the dimension of time and the dimension of value. Judgments, according to Cicero, are either judgments about the present time or about the future. And they are judgments about something either conceived to be good or conceived to be evil. This provides us with a simple matrix for the classification of judgments.

Now when we are affected by a judgment, say of something present as being good, this can take two directions. One of these directions is virtuous and healthy, the other is not virtuous and unhealthy. Let me quote from the fourth disputation:

for when the soul has this satisfaction rationally and in a tranquil and equable way, then the term *joy* is employed; when on the other hand the soul is in a transport of meaningless extravagance, then the satisfaction can be termed *exuberant* or *excessive delight* and this they define as irrational excitement of the soul. (VI, 341)

There are three basic healthy affections according to Cicero. One is joy (*gaudium*), which stems from a judgment of something present as being good. The second is wish (*voluntas*), which stems from a judgment of something good in the future. The third is precaution (*cautio*), which stems from a judgment of something evil in the future. These affections are rational and in accordance with nature. They are temperate and mild. A wise and healthy person can have these affections; indeed they are signs of such a person. Observe that we are not completing the matrix (*see overleaf*). I shall return to this below.

All other kinds of affections, according to the Stoic conception, are disorders or perturbations. Indeed all other kinds of affections can be said to be species of mental disorder. And what

	Good	Evil
Present	<i>Gaudium</i>	
Future	<i>Voluntas</i>	<i>Cautio</i>

Cicero goes on to do in the fourth disputation is to make a classification of all human affections along the two judgment-dimensions, the dimension of time and the dimension of value. In a peculiar way he is making the first *Diagnostic Manual of Mental Disorders*.

The unhealthy affections can then be classified into four main categories, representing the positions in the matrix. These categories are delight (*laetitia*), lust (*libido*), distress (*aegritudo*), and fear (*metus*). Thus, delight is the perverted variant of joy, lust is the perverted variant of wish, fear is the perverted variant of precaution, and distress is by nature always perverted. There is no healthy judgment of some present evil. The wise man cannot feel

grief or distress. He must meet the tragic aspects of life with *apatheia*.

	Good	Evil
Present	<i>Laetitia</i>	<i>Aegritudo</i>
Future	<i>Libido</i>	<i>Metus</i>

With the exception of distress, which is always an evil, the essential feature of the unhealthy disorders is that they agitate the soul much more than the healthy affections do. Since they agitate a great deal they also disturb the soul and the whole person. This is clearly contrary to the Stoic ideal of the wise person, who should be an indifferent person. Thus, the whole idea of an affection in general is questionable; the permissible affections should be very mild and conducive to the virtuous life.

This is the basic structure of Cicero's (i.e., Chrysippos') classification of affections or perturbations.

Reading 7.4**EXERCISE 4**

Extract from: Robinson, D. (1996). Immortal souls, immortal cities. Chapter 2 in *Wild Beasts and Idle Humours: the insanity defense from antiquity to the present*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Extract pages 55–56

When Roman jurists concerned themselves with *mens rea*, the matter was more or less disposed of by the very nature of the offense. By identifying an intelligible motive and locating reliable witnesses, the court was able to conclude its business. The impoverished mind of the *mente capti* or *idiotus*, and diminished power of conduct of the *furiosus*, it may be safely assumed, were so transparently obvious as to require no subtle inquiry. But what of one who had sinned in his heart in a community now won over to the view that “there cannot be a sin which is not voluntary,” and that, in any case, “only a divine power . . . can show man what the truth is”?

The very early Middle Ages not only converted much of the traditional discourse on crime and punishment into the idiom of sin and retribution, but at the same time suffered an impoverishment of the medical and physiological concepts which had provided at least background considerations for classical jurisprudence. If anything, conditions in the Western empire were even worse in these regards. In the Eastern empire Christianity would soon benefit from the teachings of Galen and from the naturalistic traditions of the classical world, but in the Western empire such sources were rarely consulted and only partially known. Even when consulted, such authorities were not used in any discerning way when conditions such as *phrenitis* and lunacy were addressed. When such maladies were discussed in quasi-scientific terms, there was no larger sense of how they might bear upon questions of adjudication. The regnant theories of the early Middle Ages were theological, not naturalistic, and the perspective on law followed in kind. The rational structure was bequeathed by centuries of Roman law, while the spiritual aims were dictated by the Fathers of the Church.

Reading 7.5**EXERCISE 5**

Three extracts from: Kramer, H. and Sprenger, J. (1996). *Malleus Malleficarum: The Classic Study of Witchcraft*. London: Bracken Books.

Extract 1: page 211

After this the Judge, having regard to the fact that the aforesaid denunciation of heresy involves of its very nature such a grave charge that it cannot and must not be lightly passed over, since to do so would imply an offence to the Divine Majesty and an injury to the Catholic Faith and to the State, shall proceed to inform himself and examine the witnesses in the following manner.

Examination of Witnesses

The witness N., of such a place, was called, sworn, and questioned whether he knew N. (naming the accused), and answered that he did. Asked how he knew him, he answered that he had seen and spoken with him on several occasions, or that they had been comrades (so explaining his reason for knowing him). Asked for how long he had known him, he answered, for ten or for so many years. Asked concerning his reputation, especially in matters concerning the faith, he answered that in his morals he was a good (or bad) man, but with regard to his faith, there was a report in such a place that he used certain practices contrary to the Faith, as a witch. Asked what was the report, he made answer. Asked whether he had seen or heard him doing such things, he again answered accordingly. Asked where he had heard him use such words, he answered, in such a place. Asked in whose presence, he answered, in the presence of such and such.

Further, he was asked whether any of the accused's kindred had formerly been burned as witches, or had been suspected, and he answered. Asked whether he associated with suspected witches, he answered. Asked concerning the manner and reason of the accused's alleged words, he answered, for such a reason and in such a manner. Asked whether he thought that the prisoner had used those words carelessly, unmeaningly and thoughtlessly, or rather with deliberate intention he answered that he had used them jokingly or in temper, or without meaning or believing what he said, or else with deliberate intention.

Asked further how he could distinguish the accused's motive, he answered that he knew it because he had spoken with a laugh.

This is a matter which must be inquired into very diligently; for very often people use words quoting someone else, or merely in temper, or as a test of the opinions of other people; although sometimes they are used assertively with definite intention.

He was further asked whether he made this deposition out of hatred or rancour, or whether he had suppressed anything out of favour or love, and he answered, etc. Following this, he was enjoined to preserve secrecy. This was done at such a place on

such a day in the presence of such witnesses called and questioned, and of me the Notary or scribe.

Here it must always be noted that in such an examination at least five persons must be present, namely, the presiding Judge, the witness or informer, the respondent or accused, who appears afterwards, and the third is the Notary or scribe: where there is no Notary the scribe shall co-opt another honest man, and these two, as has been said, shall perform the duties of the Notary; and this is provided for by Apostolic authority, as was shown above, that in this kind of action two honest men should perform as it were the duty of witnesses of the depositions.

Extract 2: page 213**Question VII**

In Which Various Doubts are Set Forth with Regard to the Foregoing Questions and Negative Answers. Whether the Accused is to be Imprisoned, and when she is to be considered as Manifestly Taken in the Foul Heresy of Witchcraft. This is the Second Action.

It is asked first what is to be done when, as often happens, the accused denies everything. We answer that the Judge has three points to consider, namely, her bad reputation, the evidence of the fact, and the words of the witnesses; and he must see whether all these agree together. And if, as very often is the case, they do not altogether agree together, since witches are variously accused of different deeds committed in some village or town; but the evidences of the fact are visible to the eye, as that a child has been harmed by sorcery, or, more often, a beast has been bewitched or deprived of its milk; and if a number of witnesses have come forward whose evidence, even if it show certain discrepancies (as that one should say she had bewitched his child, another his beast, and a third should merely witness to her reputation, and so with the others), but nevertheless agree in the substance of the fact, that is, as to the witchcraft, and that she is suspected of being a witch; although those witnesses are not enough to warrant a conviction without the fact of the general report, or even with that fact, as was shown above at the end of Question III, yet, taken in conjunction with the visible and tangible evidence of the fact, the Judge may, in consideration of these three points together, decide that the accused is to be reputed, not as strongly or gravely under suspicion (which suspicions will be explained later), but as manifestly taken in the heresy of witchcraft; provided, that is, that the witnesses are of a suitable condition and have not given evidence out of enmity, and that a sufficient number of them, say six or eight or ten have agreed together on oath.

Extract 3: page 227

If he wishes to find out whether she is endowed with a witch's power of preserving silence, let him take note whether she is able to shed tears when standing in his presence, or when being tortured. For we are taught both by the words of worthy men of

8 CHAPTER 7 READING 7.5

old and by our own experience that this is a most certain sign, and it has been found that even if she be urged and exhorted by solemn conjurations to shed tears, if she be a witch she will not be able to weep: although she will assume a tearful aspect and smear her cheeks and eyes with spittle to make it appear that she is weeping; wherefore she must be closely watched by the attendants.

In passing sentence the Judge or priest may use some such method as the following in conjuring her to true tears if she be innocent, or in restraining false tears. Let him place his hand on the head of the accused and say: I conjure you by the bitter tears shed on the Cross by our Saviour the Lord JESUS Christ for the salvation of the world, and by the burning tears poured in the evening

hour over His wounds by the most glorious Virgin MARY, His Mother, and by all the tears* which have been shed here in this world by the Saints and Elect of God, from whose eyes He has now wiped away all tears, that if you be innocent you do now shed tears, but if you be guilty that you shall by no means do so. In the name of the Father, and of the Son, and of the Holy Ghost, Amen.

And it is found by experience that the more they are conjured the less are they able to weep, however hard they may try to do so, or smear their cheeks with spittle. Nevertheless it is possible that afterwards, in the absence of the Judge and not at the time or in the place of torture, they may be able to weep in the presence of their gaolers.

* "Tears." The beautiful devotion to the Sacred Tears of Our Lord is well known. The Premonstratensians have a Mass, "De Lacryma Christi," proper to the Order.

Our Lady of Tears, Santa Maria delle Lagrime, is the Patroness of Spoleto. A picture of Our Lady, painted upon the wall of the house belonging to Diotallevio d' Antonio, which stood on the road from Spoleto to Trevi, was seen to shed tears in great abundance. Many graces and favours were obtained before the intraculous picture. A small chapel was erected on the spot in August, 1485, and Mass was daily offered therein. On 27 March, 1487, the large basilica was begun, which on its completion, 8 March, 1489, was entrusted to the Olivetans. (p. 227)

Reading 7.6

EXERCISE 6

Further extract from: Kramer, H. and Sprenger, J. (1996). *Malleus Malleficarum: The Classic Study of Witchcraft*. London: Bracken Books (Pages 1–3)

THE FIRST PART TREATING OF THE THREE NECESSARY CONCOMITANTS OF WITCHCRAFT, WHICH ARE THE DEVIL, A WITCH, AND THE PERMISSION OF ALMIGHTY GOD

Part I

Question I

Here beginneth auspiciously the first part of this work. Question the First.

Whether the belief that there are such beings as witches is so essential a part of the Catholic faith that obstinately to maintain the opposite opinion manifestly savours of heresy. And it is argued that a firm belief in witches is not a Catholic doctrine: see chapter 26, question 5, of the work of Episcopus. Whoever believes that any creature can be changed for the better or the worse, or transformed into another kind or likeness, except by the Creator of all things, is worse than a pagan and a heretic. And so when they report such things are done by witches it is not Catholic, but plainly heretical, to maintain this opinion.

Moreover, no operation of witchcraft has a permanent effect among us. And this is the proof thereof: For if it were so, it would be effected by the operation of demons. But to maintain that the devil has power to change human bodies or to do them permanent harm does not seem in accordance with the teaching of the Church. For in this way they could destroy the whole world, and bring it to utter confusion.

Moreover, every alteration that takes place in a human body—for example, a state of health or a state of sickness—can be brought down to a question of natural causes, as Aristotle has shown in his 7th book of *Physics*. And the greatest of these is the influence of the stars. But the devils cannot interfere with the movement of the stars. This is the opinion of Dionysius in his epistle to S. Polycarp. For this alone God can do. Therefore it is evident the demons cannot actually effect any permanent transformation in human bodies; that is to say, no real metamorphosis. And so we must refer the appearance of any such change to some dark and occult cause.

And the power of God is stronger than the power of the devil, so divine works are more true than demoniac operations. Whence inasmuch as evil is powerful in the world, then it must be the work of the devil always conflicting with the work of God. Therefore as it is unlawful to hold that the devil's evil craft can apparently exceed the work of God, so it is unlawful to believe that the noblest works of creation, that is to say, man and beast, can be harmed and spoiled by the power of the devil.

Moreover, that which is under the influence of a material object cannot have power over corporeal objects. But devils are subservient to certain influences of the stars, because magicians observe the course of certain stars in order to evoke the devils. Therefore they have not the power of effecting any change in a corporeal object, and it follows that witches have even less power than the demons possess.

For devils have no power at all save by a certain subtle art. But an art cannot permanently produce a true form. (And a certain author says: Writers on Alchemy know that there is no hope of any real transmutation.) Therefore the devils for their part, making use of the utmost of their craft, cannot bring about any permanent cure—or permanent disease. But if these states exist it is in truth owing to some other cause, which may be unknown, and has nothing to do with the operations of either devils or witches.

But according to the Decretals (33) the contrary is the case. "If by witchcraft or any magic art permitted by the secret but most just will of God, and aided by the power of the devil, etc. . . ." The reference here is to any act of witchcraft which may hinder the end of marriage, and for this impediment to take effect three things can concur, that is to say, witchcraft, the devil, and the permission of God. Moreover, the stronger can influence that which is less strong. But the power of the devil is stronger than any human power (*Job xl*). There is no power upon earth which can be compared to him, who was created so that he fears none.

Answer. Here are three heretical errors which must be met, and when they have been disproved the truth will be plain. For certain writers, pretending to base their opinion upon the words of S. Thomas (iv, 24) when he treats of impediments brought about by magic charms, have tried to maintain that there is not such a thing as magic, that it only exists in the imagination of those men who ascribe natural effects, the causes whereof are not known, to witchcraft and spells. There are others who acknowledge indeed that witches exist, but they declare that the influence of magic and the effects of charms are purely imaginary and phantasmical. A third class of writers maintain that the effects said to be wrought by magic spells are altogether illusory and fanciful, although it may be that the devil does really lend his aid to some witch.

The errors held by each one of these persons may thus be set forth and thus confuted. For in the very first place they are shown to be plainly heretical by many orthodox writers, and especially by S. Thomas, who lays down that such an opinion is altogether contrary to the authority of the saints and is founded upon absolute infidelity. Because the authority of the Holy Scriptures says that devils have power over the bodies and over the minds of men, when God allows them to exercise this power, as is plain from very many passages in the Holy Scriptures. Therefore those err who say that there is no such thing as witchcraft, but that it is purely imaginary, even although they do not believe that devils exist except in the imagination of the ignorant and vulgar, and the natural accidents which happen to a man he wrongly attributes to some supposed devil. For the imagination of some men is

so vivid that they think they see actual figures and appearances which are but the reflection of their thoughts, and then these are believed to be the apparitions of evil spirits or even the spectres of witches. But this is contrary to the true faith, which teaches us that certain angels fell from heaven and are now devils, and we are bound to acknowledge that by their very nature they can do many wonderful things which we cannot do. And those who try to induce others to perform such evil wonders are called witches. And because infidelity in a person who has been baptized is technically called heresy, therefore such persons are plainly heretics.

As regards those who hold the other two errors, those, that is to say, who do not deny that there are demons and that demons possess a natural power, but who differ among themselves concerning the possible effects of magic and the possible operations of witches: the one school holding that a witch can truly bring about certain effects, yet these effects are not real but phantastical, the other school allowing that some real harm does befall the person or persons injured, but that when a witch imagines this damage is

the effect of her arts she is grossly deceived. This error seems to be based upon two passages from the Canons where certain women are condemned who falsely imagine that during the night they ride abroad with Diana or Herodias.* This may be read in the Canon. Yet because such things often happen by illusion and merely in the imagination, those who suppose that all the effects of witchcraft are mere illusion and imagination are very greatly deceived. Secondly, with regard to a man who believes or maintains that a creature can be made, or changed for better or for worse, or transformed into some other kind or likeness by anyone save by God, the Creator of all things, alone, is an infidel and worse than a heathen. Wherefore on account of these words "changed for the worse" they say that such an effect if wrought by witchcraft cannot be real but must be purely phantastical.

But inasmuch as these errors savour of heresy and contradict the obvious meaning of the Canon, we will first prove our points by the divine law, as also by ecclesiastical and civil law, and first in general.

* "Diana or Herodias." This decree, which was often attributed to a General Council of Ancyra, but which is now held to be of a later date, was in any case authoritative, since it passed into the "De ecclesiasticis disciplinis" ascribed to Regino of Prum (906), and thence to the canonists S. Ivo of Chartres and Johannes Gratian. Section 364 of the Benedictine Abbot's work relates that "certain abandoned women turning aside to follow Satan, being seduced by the illusions and phantasms of demons, believe and openly profess that in the dead of night they ride upon certain beasts with the pagan goddess Diana and a countless horde of women, and that in these silent hours they fly over vast tracks of country and obey her as their mistress, while on other nights they are sullen to pay her homage." John of Salisbury, who died in 1180, in his "Policraticus," I, xvii, speaks of the popular belief in a witch-queen named Herodias, who called together the sorcerers to meeting at night. In a MS., "De Sortilegis," the following passage occurs: "We next inquire concerning certain wicked crones who believe and profess that in the night-time they ride abroad with Diana, the heathen goddess, or else with Herodias, and an innumerable host of women, upon certain beasts, and that in a silent covey at the dead of night they pass over immense distances, obeying her commands as their mistress, and that they are summoned by her on appointed nights, and they declare that they have the power to change human beings for better or for worse, ay, even to turn them into some other semblance or shape. Concerning such women I answer according to the decrees of the Council of Alexandria, that the minds of the faithful are disordered by such fantasies owing to the inspiration of no good spirit but of the devil."

Reading 7.7**EXERCISE 7**

Extract from: Zilboorg, G. and Henry, G. W. (1941). Epilogue, In *A History of Medical Psychology*. London: George Allen and Unwin. Pages 479–510. (Extract pages 522–523.)

From the day Hippocrates wrote his protesting treatise on epilepsy to the very opening of the twentieth century psychiatry has labored to sort out the definitely organic disorders from the functional psychoses and from neuroses. This task was accomplished with the thoroughness and with the genius which medicine put at the disposal of the psychiatrist. This century stands

askance before the functional psychoses and neuroses and it has only now discovered that, in order to understand them, newer psychobiological methods foreign to medical tradition must be employed.

This century presents only the beginning. It seems certain now that the twenty-five hundred years of psychiatric history which are behind us have been but preliminary centuries which cleared the field of operation and prepared the ground for a true psychiatry. The Freudian revolution—with the antagonisms, misunderstandings, apparent disruption of law and order which it caused—does seem to owe its violence as well as its influence to the fact that it was the first practical empirical step in the history of medical psychology toward the foundation of a psychiatry which would be a medical discipline.

Reading 7.8**EXERCISE 8**

Extract from the conclusions to: Shorter, E. (1997). *A History of Psychiatry: from the era of the asylum to the age of prozac*. New York: John Wiley and Sons. (Extract, p325.)

Nonetheless, if by the end of the twentieth century, “lunacy” ended up seeming less awful, the success was heavily that of psychopharmacology. It was not that people themselves had become more understanding or tolerant, merely that the drug revolution

had made it possible to dampen or abolish entirely the symptoms of psychiatric illness, so that individuals with these disorders needed be no more feared than people with a broken arm or a bruise on the head. “After 37 years,” said Pierre Deniker, who had helped initiate the pharmacological revolution, “the face of madness has been completely changed, not only by means of psychopharmacology but also by the development of psychotherapy, sociotherapy and the rehabilitation of the patients in the community.” For Deniker, “the insane or lunatic” had metamorphosed into “an ordinary patient.” Whether one deems drug therapy to be “cosmetic” psychopharmacology or not, this is no small achievement.