

CHAPTER 22

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- Reading 22.12 **Ryle, G. ([1949] 1963).** *The Concept of Mind*. London: Penguin. (Extracts pps 17–18)
- Reading 22.13 **Ryle, G. ([1949] 1963).** *The Concept of Mind*. London: Penguin. (Extract pps 119–120)

Reading 22.1**EXERCISE 1**

Review article: Porter, R. (1997). Review for London Evening Standard (a daily newspaper) of Edward Shorter's (1997) *A History of Psychiatry*.

With released psychopaths turning killers and our top-security mental units riddled with pornographic videos, the state of psychiatry is obviously disturbed. How did it get that way? Canadian Professor Edward Shorter turns to history for explanations—and for the way forward.

Psychiatry had its problems from infancy. It was clear what physical disease was, but what of mental illness? Was that real like smallpox or cancer? Or was it all in the mind? Faced with that dilemma, the subject grew up schizoid, splitting into two camps, the organic and the psychogenic.

Luckily, it seemed, these philosophical riddles wouldn't matter since a treatment for madness lay to hand the asylum. Around 1800 everyone agreed that clean, cosy, caring institutions would restore the troubled mind. A century later, however, everyone now agreed that it had all been a great mistake—the asylum had been a pipe dream, even a delusion. Patients did not recover, and institutions became dead-ends.

Shorter shows that psychiatry headed off this century in two new directions. There was a tradition of heroic interventions: leucotomy, lobotomy, ECT and other developments that now sound bizarre.

The other approach was psychoanalysis. Asylums has failed because they didn't treat patients as people. Recovery would follow, claimed the shrinks, if people talked and therapists listened; free associating would release repression and neurosis, but Shorter regards the talking cure as just another 'cul-de-sec', Freudianism was a century of 'aimless chat'.

Fortunately, he argues, history points to an alternative: a biological psychiatry based on hard science, that is neurophysiology and chemistry. Investigating the brain will bare the mysteries of the mind.

Shorter's tone is upbeat, even euphoric; but his hopeful message may be premature. How many times have we heard before that new pills hold all the answers—back in the Sixties William Sargant was predicting they would eliminate mental illness by 2000. If Freudianism is really on its last legs, why are tens of thousands of Americans now trapped in the 'repressed' (or 'false') memory syndrome sage?

Agree with him or not, Shorter's book is a stimulant in itself. There could be no better introduction to a serious subject.

Reading 22.2

EXERCISE 2

From: Editorial (1997). A comet at heaven's gate. *New Scientist*, 5 April: 3.

If you live in the northern hemisphere and you still haven't seen Comet Hale-Bopp, now is the time to look. The comet can currently be found soon after sunset in a north-westerly direction, some 25 degrees above the horizon. Its large, milky tail makes it unmistakable and far more impressive than its more famous relative, Halley's Comet, when it appeared in the skies of the southern hemisphere 12 years ago.

The advent of the comet has brought one bizarre and tragic human event, more characteristic of times when comets were viewed as messengers from the gods. Last week, near San Diego, 39 members of the Heaven's Gate cult "joyously" celebrated the arrival of Hale-Bopp by committing group suicide as the comet drew close to Earth.

To them, its appearance was the sign they had been longing for, "the time for the arrival of the spacecraft from the Level above Human to take us home to 'Their World' ". They had been waiting for 22 years, they explained on their Web site, for the arrival of higher beings who would help them "graduate from the Human Evolutionary Level" and literally carry them off to the heavens. They had previously argued against suicide but it seems that they changed their minds and decided it was time to take a short cut to a more advanced world.

Their belief that Hale-Bopp heralded the arrival of higher beings may have been strengthened by widely circulated photographs from amateur astronomers which show a huge object—claimed by some to be a massive UFO—apparently following alongside Hale-Bopp. It's hard to understand why claims like this circulate when all you need is a pair of binoculars to examine the comet closely. Disappointingly, the massive "companion" is nowhere to be seen.

Sadly, it is too late to debunk this and some of the other bizarre beliefs that motivated the members of Heaven's Gate. One of the oddest was the notion that their bodies were merely "containers" for their souls and that, when necessary, the container could be ditched—much like taking off a set of clothes, as the Heaven's Gate leader explained it.

This idea is central to many religions which means it must connect with some "universal" feeling. In this case, that feeling is the

common illusion that our conscious self sits inside us, looking out on the world and controlling our actions—rather like the Wizard of Oz.

Almost four hundred years ago, the French philosopher René Descartes expounded this view. He saw the mind as necessarily separate from and above the body, for the body could be seen to be made of parts while the mind was a whole.

But, no matter how it "feels", this view that the conscious mental world is a unity, separate from the body and controlling it, no longer seems to fit the facts. Measurements of the speed with which nerve impulses reach the cerebral cortex, coupled with experiments on people's experiences on people's experiences when the cortex is directly stimulated electrically show that we are often not conscious of events until sometime after we have reached to them.

A tennis player, for example, experiences hitting a ball long after the ball has flown back over the net, and a driver's emergency stop begins before conscious apprehension of the danger. Our brains keep the illusion of conscious control alive only by constantly "backdating" the chain of events so that they make sense.

People with various types of brain damage raise even more interesting problems. There are those, for example, who insist that they have no conscious awareness of objects in part of their visual field, but can nevertheless point to objects there and successfully guess what they are.

And there are some who can see objects perfectly well and make drawings of them but cannot recognise them or say what they are. Still others appear to have lost the sensation of having free will, or argue that their relatives have been replaced by impostors because they have lost the emotions they know they should have towards their relatives and can find no other way to explain their lack of feeling.

Our "souls", then, seem to be made up of many parts and to be very much a product of our bodies.

Unfortunately, these arguments would have cut no ice with members of Heaven's Gate. In common with other cults, they were well inoculated against rational discussion with others. They were told that they would be seen as "duped, crazy, a cult member, a drifter, a loner, a drop-out, a separatist", and that everyone else was incapable of seeing the truth because "they had been programmed to accept a set of beliefs and norms for a lifetime".

Perhaps even with a pair of binoculars, they wouldn't have been able to see that the giant UFO simply wasn't there.

Reading 22.3**EXERCISE 3**

From: Editorial (1997). Inadmissible evidence. *New Scientist*, 22 March: 3

The irony would be delicious—if it wasn't so serious. For years, all good liberals have been waging war against research into the biological basis of criminality, believing it to be a step towards Nazi-style extermination of undesirables. Then along come criminals and their lawyers embracing the science with open arms.

First to catch their eye a few years ago was the idea of “criminal” genes. “Don't blame me, my DNA made me do it” became the fashionable plea. Now brain scans are all the rage in court (see p 16) and the new plea is: “Don't blame me, my frontal lobes weren't working properly”.

Brain researchers are right to be alarmed about this abuse of their science. And yet the lawyers are only doing what clever lawyers are paid to do. What really irks is the number of brain-imaging experts who are apparently willing to give the lawyers what they want—a simplistic view of what the technique can reveal about the reasons people commit crimes.

In fact, the brain scans in question only reveal what is blindingly obvious. If a man shoots and kills a policeman at close range without a motive, you don't need a PhD in neurology to work out that his judgment was probably impaired. Impaired judgment

goes hand in hand with most violent crime. We know that because in most countries alcohol is involved in more than 90 per cent of murders.

What really matters in assessing that defendant's guilt and the appropriate punishment, is whether he was oblivious to the difference between right and wrong.

And unfortunately or fortunately, depending on your point of view, there isn't a brain-imaging technique in the world that can establish that. Neuroscientists have a hard enough time working out how the brain creates the mental illusion of visual perception, let alone the illusion of moral judgment and free will.

But let's be clear about this. Violent crime does have some connection with involuntary, disturbed patterns of brain activity in the frontal lobes: in some criminals, it probably has a lot to do with it. The problem is that we could never know what (if any) part such individual “neural signatures” might have had in shaping or triggering any particular bit of impulsive or criminal behaviour. The science isn't even precise enough to say whether this or that patch of unusually low brain activity in a scan was caused by drug abuse, a difficult birth, genes—or watching too much TV.

Brain scans can make a valuable contribution to the business of crime and punishment. Outside the courtroom, psychiatrists could use them more often to decide which violent criminals could benefit most from medication or from being housed in specialist hospitals. In other words, brain imaging should be used for what it was designed for—diagnosing medical conditions, not moral ones.

Reading 22.4**EXERCISE 3**

Article from: Anon (1997). Anorexia trigger found in the brain. *Sunday Times*, 13 April. (The *Sunday Times* is a 'broad sheet' newspaper.)

Doctors have discovered that children with anorexia may be suffering from a brain abnormality—the first time a physical factor has been shown to play a part in youngsters developing the eating disorder.

Researchers from the Hospital for Sick Children in Great Ormond Street, London, will reveal at an international conference on eating disorders this week that some children appear to have a biological vulnerability to anorexia.

An estimated one in 100 teenagers and young women suffer from anorexia. At Great Ormond Street, the only NHS unit dealing with children's eating disorders, doctors are treating sufferers as young as seven years old.

The part of the brain where doctors have discovered an abnormality the anterior temporal lobe—governs the regulation of appetite, sense of fullness, emotional expressiveness and visual perception. Anorexics usually experience problems in all these areas.

High-tech scans showed that children suffering from the condition have a reduced blood flow of at 10% between the temporal lobes in the brain; in some children, the reduction was between 20% and 30%.

Dr Bryan Lask, a consultant psychiatrist, and Dr Rachel Bryant-Waugh, a consultant psychologist, who undertook the study with Dr Isky Gordon, a consultant radiologist, described the findings as surprising. 'There is something interesting and unexpected going on. Children with other conditions do not have this abnormality' said Lask. . . .


The researchers emphasise that a biological vulnerability alone cannot explain why children develop anorexia. Genetic influences, personality traits, social factors and stress will still play a crucial part in causing eating disorders.

Researchers believe there are several triggers for anorexia the number of cases is doubling every decade, and there are an estimated 70,000 sufferers . . .

Anorexics commonly believe themselves to be fat when they see themselves in the mirror and Bryant-Waugh suspects that eventually they will find that the abnormal blood flow is related to the distorted vision sufferers have of their body shape.

If this is shown to be the case, anorexics could eventually be given treatment to speed up blood flow to correct their impression of their body image.

The research findings also may help alleviate the guilt felt by parents when their children become anorexic. 'I will be able to say to parents there is a major biological factor happening in your daughter's brain and causing her to behave this way. It is not your fault,' said Lask.






Reading 22.5

EXERCISE 4

Extract from: Anon (1996). Lazy wife has her head examined.
The Times, 2 September (1)

A house-proud woman who decided she was fed up cleaning and preferred to watch television had to defend herself to doctors who feared that she was ill.

The 55-year old housewife argued that her change of habit was entirely reasonable after decades of looking after the family home. Doctors in the neurology department of the Radcliffe Infirmary, Oxford, agreed with her husband that her personality change required investigation . . .



Reading 22.6**EXERCISE 5**

Extended extract from: Anon (1996). *Lazy wife has her head examined. The Times*, 2 September (2). (italic added)

A house-proud woman who decided she was fed up cleaning and preferred to watch television had to defend herself to doctors who feared that she was ill.

The 55-year old housewife argued that her change of habit was entirely reasonable after decades of looking after the family home. Doctors in the neurology department of the Radcliffe Infirmary, Oxford, agreed with her husband that her personality change required investigation . . .

They were right. A brain scan discovered a tumour the size of a grapefruit. The surgeon who removed it said it was the largest he

had seen. Called a meningioma, it is thought to have been growing for at least 15 years.

Mike Hanna, the neurologist who examined the woman, said 'She was referred to us by her GP because of her husband's concerns. Although her views were perfectly reasonable, we had to take account of her husband's views and those of her family and friends who insisted her behaviour was out of character.

Dr Hanna, who sent a copy of the scan to the British Medical Journal, said 'Nine times out of ten, someone who undergoes a personality change will have a depressive illness. One time in ten, or less, something may be going on in their brain.' The benign tumour at the front of her brain was pushing aside the frontal lobes. The tip of the lobes are known to be where aspects of personality such as drive and motivation reside.

Reading 22.7**EXERCISE 6**

Full article from: Anon (1996). *Lazy wife has her head examined.*
The Times, 2 September (3). (italic added)

A house-proud woman who decided she was fed up cleaning and preferred to watch television had to defend herself to doctors who feared that she was ill.

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Two months after surgery, she has not recovered her enthusiasm for housework. Dr. Hanna said: 'If the tumour had gone on growing she would almost certainly have died. The pressure may have changed her personality for good.'

Reading 22.8

EXERCISE 9

2 extracts From: Descartes (1996). Second meditation. *In Meditations* (ed. J. Cottingham). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Extracts pp 16–18, 19.)

Extract 1: pages 16–18

The nature of the human mind, and how it is better known than the body

So serious are the doubts into which I have been thrown as a result of yesterday's meditation that I can neither put them out of my mind nor see any way of resolving them. It feels as if I have fallen unexpectedly into a deep whirlpool which tumbles me around so that I can neither stand on the bottom nor swim up to the top. Nevertheless I will make an effort and once more attempt the same path which I started on yesterday. Anything which admits of the slightest doubt I will set aside just as if I had found it to be wholly false; and I will proceed in this way until I recognize something certain, or, if nothing else, until I at least recognize for certain that there is no certainty. Archimedes used to demand just one firm and immovable point in order to shift the entire earth; so I too can hope for great things if I manage to find just one thing, however slight, that is certain and unshakeable.

I will suppose then, that everything I see is spurious. I will believe that my memory tell me lies, and that none of the things that it reports ever happened. I have no senses. Body, shape, extension, movement and place are chimeras. So what remains true? Perhaps just the one fact that nothing is certain.

Yet apart from everything I have just listed, how do I know that there is not something else which does not allow even the slightest occasion for doubt? Is there not a God, or whatever I may call him, who puts into me¹ the thoughts I am now having? But why do I think this, since I myself may perhaps be the author of these thoughts? In that case am not I, at least, something? But I have just said that I have no senses and no body. This is the sticking point: what follows from this? Am I not so bound up with a body and with senses that I cannot exist without them? But I have convinced myself that there is absolutely nothing in the world, no sky, no earth, no minds, no bodies. Does it now follow that I too do not exist? No: if I convinced myself of something² then I certainly existed. But there is a deceiver of supreme power and cunning who is deliberately and constantly deceiving me. In that case I too undoubtedly exist, if he is deceiving me; and let him deceive me as much as he can, he will never bring it about that I am nothing so long as I think that I am something. So after considering everything very thoroughly, I must finally conclude that this proposition, *I am, I exist*, is necessarily true whenever it is put forward by me or conceived in my mind.

¹ '... Puts into my mind', (French version).

² '... or through anything at all' (Fresh version).

But I do not yet have a sufficient understanding of what this 'I' is, that now necessarily exists. So I must be on my guard against carelessly taking something else to be this 'I', and so making a mistake in the very item of knowledge that I maintain is the most certain and evident of all. I will therefore go back and meditate on what I originally believed myself to be, before I embarked on this present train of thought. I will then subtract anything capable of being weakened, even minimally, by the arguments now introduced, so that what is left at the end may be exactly and only what is certain and unshakeable.

What then did I formerly think I was? A man. But what is a man? Shall I say 'a rational animal'? No; for then I should have to inquire what an animal is, what rationality is, and in this way one question would lead me down the slope to other harder ones, and I do not now have the time to waste on subtleties of this kind. Instead I propose to concentrate on what came into my thoughts spontaneously and quite naturally whenever I used to consider what I was. Well, the first thought to come to mind was that I had a face, hands, arms and the whole mechanical structure of limbs which can be seen in a corpse, and which I called the body. The next thought was that I was nourished, that I moved about, and that I engaged in sense-perception and thinking; and these actions I attributed to the soul. But as to the nature of this soul, either I did not think about this or else I imagined it to be something tenuous, like a wind or fire or ether, which permeated my more solid parts. As to the body, however, I had no doubts about it, but thought I knew its nature distinctly. If I had tried to describe the mental conception I had of it, I would have expressed it as follows: by a body I understand whatever has a determinable shape and a definable location and can occupy a space in such a way as to exclude any other body; it can be perceived by touch, sight, hearing, taste or smell, and can be moved in various ways, not by itself but by whatever else comes into contact with it. For, according to my judgement, the power of self-movement, like the power of sensation or of thought, was quite foreign to the nature of a body; indeed, it was a source of wonder to me that certain bodies were found to contain faculties of this kind.

But what shall I now say that I am, when I am supposing that there is some supremely powerful and, if it is permissible to say so, malicious deceiver, who is deliberately trying to trick me in every way he can? Can I now assert that I possess even the most insignificant of all the attributes which I have just said belong to the nature of a body? I scrutinize them, think about them, go over them again, but nothing suggests itself; it is tiresome and pointless to go through the list once more. But what about the attributes I assigned to the soul? Nutrition or movement? Since now I do not have a body, these are mere fabrications. Sense-perception? This surely does not occur without a body, and besides, when asleep I have appeared to perceive through the senses many things which I afterwards realized I did not perceive through the senses at all. Thinking? At last I have discovered it—thought; this alone is inseparable from me. I am, I exist—that is certain. But

for how long? For as long as I am thinking. For it could be that were I totally to cease from thinking, I should totally cease to exist. At present I am not admitting anything except what is necessarily true. I am, then, in the strict sense only a thing that thinks;³ that is, I am a mind, or intelligence, or intellect, or reason—words whose meaning I have been ignorant of until now. But for all that I am a thing which is real and which truly exists. But what kind of a thing? As I have just said—a thinking thing.

Extract 2: page 19

This is a considerable list, if everything on it belongs to me. But does it? Is it not one and the same ‘I’ who is now doubting almost everything, who nonetheless understands some things, who

³ The word ‘only’ is most naturally taken as going with ‘a thing that thinks’, and this interpretation is followed in the French version. When discussing this passage with Gassendi, however, Descartes suggests that he meant the ‘only’ to govern ‘in the strict sense’; cf AT IXA 215; CSM II 276.

affirms that this one thing is true, denies everything else, desires to know more, is unwilling to be deceived, imagines many things even involuntarily, and is aware of many things which apparently come from the senses? Are not all these things just as true as the fact that I exist, even if I am asleep all the time, and even if he who created me is doing all he can to deceive me? Which of all these activities is distinct from my thinking? Which of them can be said to be separate from myself? The fact that it is I who am doubting and understanding and willing is so evident that I see no way of making it any clearer. But it is also the case that the ‘I’ who imagines is the same ‘I’. For even if, as I have supposed, none of the objects of imagination are real, the power of imagination is something which really exists and is part of my thinking. Lastly, it is also the same ‘I’ who has sensory perceptions, or is aware of bodily things as it were through the senses. For example, I am now seeing light, hearing a noise, feeling heat. But I am asleep, so all this is false. Yet I certainly *seem* to see, to hear, and to be warmed. This cannot be false; what is called ‘having a sensory perception’ is strictly just this, and in this restricted sense of the term it is simply thinking.

Reading 22.9

EXERCISE 10

Extract from: Descartes, R. (1968). Discourse 4. In *Discourse on Method and the Meditations* (trans. and with an introduction by F.E. Sutcliffe). London: Penguin Books. (Extract pp. 53–54.)

I do not know if I ought to tell you about the first meditations I pursued there, for they are so abstract and unusual that they will probably not be to the taste of everyone; and yet, so that one may judge if the foundations I have laid are firm enough, I find myself to some extent forced to speak of them. I had long ago noticed that, in matters relating to conduct, one needs sometimes to follow, just as if they were absolutely indubitable, opinions one knows to be very unsure, as has been said above; but as I wanted to concentrate solely on the search for truth, I thought I ought to do just the opposite, and reject as being absolutely false everything in which I could suppose the slightest reason for doubt, in order to see if there did not remain after that anything in my belief which was entirely indubitable. So, because our senses sometimes play us false, I decided to suppose that there was nothing at all which was such as they cause us to imagine it; and because there are men who make mistakes in reasoning, even with the simplest geometrical matters, and make paralogisms, judging that I was as liable to error as anyone else, I rejected as being false all the reasonings I had hitherto accepted as proofs. And finally, considering that all the same thoughts that we have when we are awake can also come to us when we are asleep, without any one of them then being true, I resolved to pretend that nothing which had ever entered my mind was any more true than the illusions of my dreams. But immediately afterwards I became aware that, while I decided thus to think that everything was

false, it followed necessarily that I who thought thus must be something; and observing that this truth: *I think, therefore I am*, was so certain and so evident that all the most extravagant suppositions of the sceptics were not capable of shaking it, I judged that I could accept it without scruple as the first principle of the philosophy I was seeking.

Then, examining attentively what I was, and seeing that I could pretend that I had no body and that there was no world or place that I was in, but that I could not, for all that, pretend that I did not exist, and that, on the contrary, from the every fact that I thought of doubting the truth of other things, it followed very evidently and very certainly that I existed; while, on the other hand, if I had only ceased to think, although all the rest of what I had ever imagined had been true, I would have had no reason to believe that I existed; I thereby concluded that I was a substance, of which the whole essence or nature consists in thinking, and which, in order to exist, needs no place and depends on no material thing; so that this 'I', that is to say, the mind, by which I am what I am, is entirely distinct from the body, and even that it is easier to know than the body, and moreover, that even if the body were not, it would not cease to be all that it is.

After this, I considered in general what is needed for a proposition to be true and certain; for, since I had just found one which I knew to be so, I thought that I ought also to know what this certainty consisted of. And having noticed that there is nothing at all in this, *I think, therefore I am*, which assures me that I am speaking the truth, except that I see very clearly that in order to think one must exist, I judged that I could take it to be a general rule that the things we conceive very clearly and very distinctly are all true, but that there is nevertheless some difficulty in being able to recognize for certain which are the things we see distinctly.

Reading 22.10**EXERCISE 11**

Extract from: Hobbes, T. (1984). 'Objections' to Descartes' *Meditations*. In *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes* (trans. J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff, and D. Murdoch), Vol. 2. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Extracts pp. 122–123)

On the Second Meditation ('The nature of the human mind')

Second objection

I am a thinking thing.

Correct. For from the fact that I think, or have an image (whether I am awake or dreaming), it can be inferred that I am thinking; for 'I think' and 'I am thinking' mean the same thing. And from the fact that I am thinking it follows that I exist, since that which thinks is not nothing. But when the author adds 'that is, I am a mind, or intelligence, or intellect or reason',¹ a doubt arises. It does not seem to be a valid argument to say 'I am thinking, therefore I am thought' or 'I am using my intellect, hence I am an intellect.' I might just as well say 'I am walking, therefore I am a walk.' M. Descartes is identifying the thing which understands with intellection, which is an act of that which understands. Or at least he is identifying the thing which understands with the intellect, which is a power of that which understands. Yet all philosophers make a distinction between a subject and its faculties and acts, i.e. between a subject and its properties and its essences: an entity is one thing, its essence is another. Hence it may be that the thing that thinks is the subject to which mind, reason or intellect belong; and this subject may thus be some-

thing corporeal. The contrary is assumed, not proved. Yet this inference is the basis of the conclusion which M. Descartes seems to want to establish.

In the same passage we find the following: 'I know I exist; the question is, what is this "I" that I know. If the "I" is understood strictly as we have been taking it, then it is quite certain that knowledge of it does not depend on things of whose existence I am as yet unaware.'²

It is quite certain that the knowledge of the proposition 'I exist' depends on the proposition 'I am thinking' as the author himself has explained to us. But how do we know the proposition 'I am thinking'? It can only be from our inability to conceive an act without its subject. We cannot conceive of jumping without a jumper, of knowing without a knower, or of thinking without a thinker.

It seems to follow from this that a thinking thing is something corporeal. For it seems that the subject of any act can be understood only in terms of something corporeal or in terms of matter, as the author himself shows later on his example of the wax:³ the wax, despite the changes in its colour, hardness, shape and other acts, is still understood to be the same thing, that is, the same matter that is the subject of all these changes. Moreover, I do not infer that I am thinking by means of another thought. For although someone may think that he *was* thinking (for this thought is simply an act of remembering), it is quite impossible for him to think that he thinking, or to know that he is knowing. For then an infinite chain of questions would arise: 'How do you know that you know that you know . . . ?'

The knowledge of the proposition 'I exist' thus depends on the knowledge of the proposition 'I am thinking'; and knowledge of the latter proposition depends on our inability to separate thought from the matter that is thinking. So it seems that the correct inference is that the thinking thing is material rather than immaterial.

² *Ibid.*

³ Above pp. 20ff.

¹ Above p. 18.

Reading 22.11

EXERCISE 12

Two extracts from: Kant's ([1781] 1929) *Critique of Pure Reason*, (trans. N. Kemp Smith). London: Macmillan. (Extracts pp. 368–372 and 380–381)

*Extract 1: pages 368–372***The Paralogisms of Pure Reason¹****[As restated in second edition]**

Since² the proposition 'I think' (taken problematically) contains the form of each and every judgment of understanding and accompanies all categories as their vehicle, it is evident that the inferences from it admit only of a transcendental employment of the understanding. And since this employment excludes any admixture of experience, we cannot, after what has been shown above, entertain any favourable anticipations in regard to its methods of procedure. We therefore propose to follow it, with a critical eye, through all the predicaments of pure psychology. But for the sake of brevity the examination had best proceed in an unbroken continuity.

The following general remark may, at the outset, aid us in our scrutiny of this kind of argument. I do not know an object merely in that I think, but only in so far as I determine a given intuition with respect to the unity of consciousness in which all thought consists. Consequently, I do not know myself through being conscious of myself as thinking, but only when I am conscious of the³ intuition of myself as determined with respect to the function of thought. *Modi* of self-consciousness in thought are not by themselves concepts of objects (categories), but are mere functions which do not give thought an object to be known, and accordingly do not give even myself as object. The object is not the consciousness of the *determining* self, but only that⁴ of the *determinable* self, that is, of my inner intuition (in so far as its manifold can be combined in accordance with the universal condition of the unity of apperception in thought).

(1) In all judgments I am the *determining* subject of that relation which constitutes the judgment. That the 'I', the 'I' that thinks, can be regarded always as *subject*, and as something which does not belong to thought as a mere predicate, must be granted. It is an apodeictic and indeed *identical* proposition; but it does not mean that I, as *object*, am for myself a *self-subsistent* being or *substance*. The latter statement goes very far beyond the former, and demands for its proof data which are not to be met with in thought, and perhaps (in so far as I have regard to the thinking self merely as such) are more than I shall ever find in it.

(2) That the 'I' of apperception, and therefore the 'I' in every act of thought, is *one*,⁵ and cannot be resolved into a plurality of

subjects, and consequently signifies a logically simple subject, is something already contained in the very concept of thought, and is therefore an analytic proposition. But this does not mean that the thinking 'I' is a simple *substance*. That proposition would be synthetic. The concept of substance always relates to intuitions which cannot in me be other than sensible, and which therefore lie entirely outside the field of the understanding and its thought. But it is of this thought that we are speaking when we say that the 'I' in thought is simple. It would, indeed, be surprising if what in other cases requires so much labour to determine—namely, what, of all that is presented in intuition, is substance, and further, whether this substance can be simple (*e.g.* in the parts of matter)—should be thus given me directly, as if by revelation, in the poorest of all representations.

(3) The proposition, that in all the manifold of which I am conscious I am identical with myself, is likewise implied in the concepts themselves, and is therefore an analytic proposition. But this identity of the subject, of which I can be conscious in all my⁶ representations, does not concern any intuition of the subject, whereby it is given as object, and cannot therefore signify the identity of the person, if by that is understood the consciousness of the identity of one's own substance, as a thinking being, in all change of its states. No mere analysis of the proposition 'I think' will suffice to prove such a proposition; for that we should require various synthetic judgments, based upon given intuition.

(4) That I distinguish my own existence as that of a thinking being, from other things outside me—among them my body—is likewise an analytic proposition; for *other* things are such as I think to be *distinct* from myself. But I do not thereby learn whether this consciousness of myself would be even possible apart from things outside me through which representations are given to me, and whether, therefore, I could exist merely as thinking being (*i.e.* without existing in human form).

The analysis, then, of the consciousness of myself in thought in general, yields nothing whatsoever towards the knowledge of myself as object. The logical exposition of thought in general has been mistaken for a metaphysical determination of the object.

Indeed, it would be a great stumbling-block, or rather would be the one unanswerable objection, to our whole critique, if there were a possibility of proving *a priori* that all thinking beings are in themselves simple substances, and that consequently (as follows from this same mode of proof) personality is inseparable from them, and that they are conscious of their existence as separate and distinct from all matter. For by such procedure we should have taken a step beyond the world of sense, and have entered into the field of noumena; and no one could then deny our right of advancing yet further in this domain, indeed of settling in it, and, should our star prove auspicious, of establishing claims to permanent possession. The proposition, 'Every thinking being is, as such, a simple substance', is a synthetic *a priori* proposition; it is synthetic in that it goes beyond the concept from which

¹ [What follows, up to p. 383, is Kant's restatement of the Paralogisms, in B.]

² [In sequence to p. 332, above.]

³ [Reading, with Grillo, *der* for *die*.]

⁴ [Reading, with Hartenstein, *das* for *die*.]

⁵ [*ein Singular*.]

⁶ [Reading, with Erdmann, *meinen* for *seinen*.]

it starts, and adds to the thought in general [*i.e.* to the concept of a thinking being] the mode of [its] existence: it is *a priori*, in that it adds to the concept a predicate (that of simplicity) which cannot be given in any experience. It would then follow that *a priori* synthetic propositions are possible and admissible, not only, as we have asserted, in relation to objects of possible experience, and indeed as principles of the possibility of this experience, but that they are applicable to things in general and to things in themselves—a result that would make an end of our whole critique, and would constrain us to acquiesce in the old-time procedure. Upon closer consideration we find, however, that there is no such serious danger.

The whole procedure of rational psychology is determined by a paralogism, which is exhibited in the following syllogism:

That which cannot be thought otherwise than as subject does not exist otherwise than as subject, and is therefore substance.

A thinking being, considered merely as such, cannot be thought otherwise than as subject.

Therefore it exists also only as subject, that is, as substance.

In the major premises we speak of a being that can be thought in general, in every relation, and therefore also as it may be given in intuition. But in the minor premises we speak of it only in so far as it regards itself, as subject, simply in relation to thought and the unity of consciousness, and not as likewise in relation to the intuition through which it⁷ is given as object to thought. Thus the conclusion is arrived at fallaciously, *per sophisma figurae dictionis*.^a

That we are entirely right in resolving this famous argument into a paralogism will be clearly seen, if we call to mind what has been said in the General Note to the Systematic Representation of the Principles and in the Section on Noumena. For it has there been proved that the concept of a thing which can exist by itself as subject and never as mere predicate, carries with it no objective reality; in other words, that we cannot know whether there is any object to which the concept is applicable—as to the possibility of such a mode of existence we have no means of deciding—and that the concept therefore yields no knowledge whatsoever. If by the term ‘substance’ be meant an object which can be given, and if it is to yield knowledge, it must be made to rest on a permanent intuition, as being that through which alone the object of our concept can be given, and as being, therefore, the indispensable condition of the objective reality of the concept. Now in inner intuition there is nothing permanent, for the ‘I’ is merely the consciousness of my thought. So long, therefore, as we do not go beyond mere thinking,

⁷ [Reading, with Vorländer, *es für sie*.]

^a ‘Thought’ is taken in the two premises in totally different senses: in the major premises, as relating to an object in general and therefore to an object as it may be given in intuition; in the minor premises, only as it consists in relation to self-consciousness. In this latter sense, no object whatsoever is being thought; all that is being represented is simply the relation to self as subject (as the form of thought). In the former premiss we are speaking of *things* which cannot be thought otherwise than as subjects; but in the latter premiss we speak not of *things* but of *thought* (abstraction being made from all objects) in which the ‘I’ always serves as the subject of consciousness. The conclusion cannot, therefore, be, ‘I cannot exist otherwise than as subject’, but merely, ‘In thinking my existence, I cannot employ myself, save as subject of the judgment [therein involved]’. This is an identical proposition, and casts no light whatsoever upon the mode of my existence.

we are without the necessary condition for applying the concept of substance, that is, of a self-subsistent subject, to the self as a thinking being. And with the objective reality of the concept of substance, the allied concept of simplicity likewise vanishes; it is transformed into a merely logical qualitative unity of self-consciousness in thought in general, which has to be present whether the subject be composite or not.

Extract 2: pages 380–381

Conclusion, in regard to the solution of the psychological paralogism

The dialectical illusion in rational psychology arises from the confusion of an idea of reason—the idea of a pure intelligence—with the completely undetermined concept of a thinking being in general. I think myself on behalf of a possible experience, at the same time abstracting from all actual experience; and I conclude therefrom that I can be conscious of my existence even apart from experience and its empirical conditions. In so doing I am confusing the possible *abstraction* from my empirically determined existence with the supposed consciousness of a possible *separate* existence of my thinking self, and I thus come to believe that I have *knowledge* that what is substantial in me is the transcendental subject. But all that I really have in thought is simply the unity of consciousness, on which, as the mere form of knowledge, all determination is based.

The task of explaining the communion of the soul with the body does not properly belong to the psychology with which we are here dealing. For this psychology proposes to prove the personality of the soul even apart from this communion (that is, after death), and is therefore *transcendent* in the proper sense of that term. It does, indeed, occupy itself with an object of experience, but only in that aspect in which⁸ it ceases to be an object of experience. Our teaching, on the other hand, does supply a sufficient answer to this question. The difficulty peculiar to the problem consists, as is generally recognised, in the assumed heterogeneity of the object of inner sense (the soul) and the objects of the outer senses, the formal condition of their intuition being, in the case of the former, time only, and in the case of the latter, also space. But if we consider that the two kinds of objects thus differ from each other, not inwardly but only in so far as one *appears* outwardly to the other, and that what, as thing in itself, underlies the appearance of matter, perhaps after all may not be so heterogeneous in character, this difficulty vanishes, the only question that remains being how in general a communion of substances is possible. This, however, is a question which lies outside the field of psychology, and which the reader, after what has been said in the Analytic regarding fundamental powers and faculties, will not hesitate to regard as likewise lying outside the field of all human knowledge. (pp. 380–381)

⁸ [*nur sofern*.]

Reading 22.12**EXERCISE 13**

Three extracts from: Ryle, G. ([1949] 1963). *The Concept of Mind*. London: Penguin. (Extracts pps 17–18)

Extract 1: pages 17–18**(2) The absurdity of the official doctrine**

Such in outline is the official theory. I shall often speak of it, with deliberate abusiveness, as ‘the dogma of the Ghost in the Machine’ hope to prove that it is entirely false, and false not in detail but in principle. It is not merely an assemblage of particular mistakes. It is one big mistake and a mistake of a special kind. It is, namely, a category-mistake. It represents the facts of mental life as if they belonged to one logical type or category (or range of types or categories), when they actually belong to another. The dogma is therefore a philosopher’s myth. In attempting to explode the myth I shall probably be taken to be denying well-known facts about the mental life of human beings, and my plea that I aim at doing nothing more than rectify the logic of mental-conduct concepts will probably be disallowed as mere subterfuge.

I must first indicate what is meant by the phrase ‘Category-mistake’. This I do in a series of illustrations.

A foreigner visiting Oxford or Cambridge for the first time is shown a number of colleges, libraries, playing fields, museums, scientific departments and administrative offices. He then asks ‘But where is the University? I have seen where the members of the Colleges live, where the Registrar works, where the scientists experiment and the rest. But I have not yet seen the University in which reside and work the members of your University.’ It has then to be explained to him that the University is not another collateral institution, some ulterior counterpart to the colleges, laboratories and offices which he has seen. The University is just the way in which all that he has already seen is organized. When they are seen and when their coordination is understood, the University has been seen. His mistake lay in his innocent assumption that it was correct to speak of Christ Church, the Bodleian Library, the Ashmolean Museum

and the University, to speak, that is, as if ‘the University’ stood for an extra member of the class of which these other units are members. He was mistakenly allocating the University to the same category as that to which the other institutions belong.

Extract 2: page 18

One more illustration. A foreigner watching his first game of cricket learns what are the functions of the bowlers, the batsmen, the fielders, the umpires and the scores. He then says ‘But there is no one left on the field to contribute the famous element of team-spirit. I see who does the bowling, the batting, and the wicket-keeping; but I do not see whose role it is to exercise *esprit de corps*.’ Once more, it would have to be explained that he was looking for the wrong type of thing. Team-spirit is not another cricketing-operation supplementary to all of the other special tasks. It is, roughly, the keenness with which each of the special tasks is performed, and performing a task keenly is not performing two tasks. Certainly exhibiting team-spirit is not the same thing as bowling or catching, but nor is it a third thing such that we can say that the bowler first bowls *and* then exhibits team-spirit or that a fielder is at a given moment *either* catching *or* displaying *esprit de corps*.

Extract 3: page 19–20

My destructive purpose is to show that a family of radical category-mistakes is the source of the double-life theory. The representation of a person as a ghost mysteriously ensconced in a machine derives from this argument. Because, as is true, a person’s thinking, feeling and purposive doing cannot be described solely in the idioms of physics, chemistry and physiology, therefore they must be described in counterpart idioms. As the human body is a complex organized unit, so the human mind must be another complex organized unit, though one made of a different sort of stuff and with a different sort of structure. Or, again, as the human body, like any other parcel of matters, is a field of causes and effects, so the mind must be another field of causes and effects, though not (Heaven be praised) mechanical causes and effects.

Reading 22.13

EXERCISE 14

Further extract from: Ryle, G. ([1949] 1963). *The Concept of Mind*. London: Penguin. (Extract pps 119–120)

We can now come back to consider dispositional statements, namely statements to the effect that a mentioned thing, beast or person, has a certain capacity, tendency, or propensity, or is subject to a certain liability. It is clear that such statements are not laws, for they mention particular things or persons. On the other hand they resemble laws in being partly 'variable' or 'open'. To say that this lump of sugar is soluble is to say that it would dissolve, if submerged anywhere, at any time and in any parcel of water. To say that this sleeper knows French, is to say that if, for example, he is ever addressed in French, or shown any French newspaper, he responds pertinently in French, acts appropriately or translates it correctly into his own tongue. This is, of course, too precise. We should not withdraw our statement that he knows French on finding that he did not respond pertinently when asleep, absentminded, drunk, or in a panic; or on finding that he did not correctly translate highly technical treatises. We expect no more than that he will ordinarily cope pretty well with the majority of ordinary French-using and French-following tasks. 'Knows French' is a vague expression and, for most purposes, none the less useful for being vague.

The suggestion has been made that dispositional statements about mentioned individuals, while not themselves laws, are deductions from laws, so that we have to learn some perhaps crude and vague laws before we can make such dispositional statements. But in general the learning process goes the other way. We learn to make a number of dispositional statements about individuals before we learn laws stating general correlations between such statements. We find that some individuals are both oviparous and feathered, before we learn that any individual that is feathered is oviparous.

Dispositional statements about particular things and persons are also like law statements in the fact that we use them in a partly similar way. They apply to, or they are satisfied by, the actions, reactions and states of the object; they are inference-tickets, which license us to predict, retrodict, explain, and modify these actions, reactions, and states.

Naturally, the addicts of the superstition that all true indicative sentences either describe existents or report occurrences will demand that sentences such as 'this wire conducts electricity', or

'John Doe knows French', shall be construed as conveying factual information of the same type as that conveyed by 'this wire is conducting electricity' and 'John Doe is speaking French'. How could the statements be true unless there were something now going on, even though going on, unfortunately, behind the scenes? Yet they have to agree that we do often know that a wire conducts electricity and that individuals know French, without having first discovered any undiscoverable goings on. They have to concede, too, that the theoretical utility of discovering these hidden goings on would consist only in its entitling us to do just that predicting, explaining, and modifying which we already do and often know that we are entitled to do. They would have to admit, finally, that these postulated processes are themselves, at the best, things the existence of which they themselves infer from the fact that we can predict, explain, and modify the observable actions and reactions of individuals. But if they demand actual 'rails' where ordinary inferences are made, they will have to provide some further actual 'rails' to justify their own peculiar inference from the legitimacy of ordinary inferences to the 'rails' which they postulate to carry them. The postulation of such an endless hierarchy of 'rails' could hardly be attractive even to those who are attracted by its first step.

Dispositional statements are neither reports of observed or observable states of affairs, nor yet reports of unobserved or unobservable states of affairs. They narrate no incidents. But their jobs are intimately connected with narratives of incidents, for, if they are true, they are satisfied by narrated incidents. 'John Doe has just been telephoning in French' satisfies what is asserted by 'John Doe knows French', and a person who has found out that John Doe knows French perfectly needs no further ticket to enable him to argue from his having read a telegram in French to his having made sense of it. Knowing that John Doe knows French is being in possession of that ticket, and expecting him to understand this telegram is travelling with it.

It should be noticed that there is no incompatibility in saying that dispositional statements narrate no incidents and allowing the patent fact that dispositional statements can have tenses. 'He was a cigarettesmoker for a year' and 'the rubber began to lose its elasticity last summer' are perfectly legitimate dispositional statements; and if it were never true that an individual might be going to know something, there could exist no teaching profession. There can be short-term, long-term, or termless inference-tickets. A rule of cricket might be in force only for an experimental period, and even the climate of a continent might change from epoch to epoch.